联盟的稳定性是联盟博弈中一个重要的概念。传统的联盟博弈理论是假设每一个代理人的偏好都是公开的，但是在实际应用中，不少软件代理人的应用系统并不符合这个前提，他们往往是拥有私人信念的个体，因此他们不是按照全体代理人拥有的共同信念来行动的。针对以上问题，本书对传统的稳定性概念中的“核”概念进行扩充，提出一套新的概念，分析带有不确定性并且以信念为基础的联盟的稳定性，并展示这套新概念如何应用于一类新的联盟博弈——以信念为本位的联盟博弈。

本书可供人工智能和计算机科学领域的研究生、工程师以及研究人员参考。

Front Matter
Chapter 1 Multi-agent Cooperation and Stability
  1.1 Semi-competitive Multi-agent Systems
  1.2 Coalition Formation and Game Theory
  1.3 Problem with the Common Knowledge Assumption
  References
Chapter 2 Non-transferable Utility Games andCoalition Formation Mechanisms
  2.1 Non-transferable Utility Cooperative Games
  2.2 Transferable Utility Cooperative Games
  2.3 Coalition Formation Mechanisms
  2.4 Belief and Uncertainties
  References
Chapter 3 Two Classes of Stability— Strong Core and Weak Core
  3.1 Coalition Formation and Stability
  3.2 An Example
  3.3 NTU Games with Internal Uncertainty
  3.4 Opinions and Preferences of Agents
  3.5 The Strong Core and the Weak Core
  3.6 Effect of Refinedness of Agent Opinions
  3.7 Application Areas
  3.8 Summary
  References
Chapter 4 The b-Core: Belief-based CoalitionStability
  4.1 Games Without Common Knowledge
  4.2 Belief-based Coalitional Games
  4.3 NTU Games with Private Beliefs
  4.4 The Core, the b-Core and Belief Accuracy
  4.5 Discussion
  4.6 On Dynamic Beliefs
  4.7 Summary
  References
Chapter 5 Example Application of the b-Core:Buyer Coalition Problem with Beliefs
  5.1 Buyer Coalition Problems
  5.2 Background of Buyer Coalition Problem
  5.3 A Distributed Mechanism
  5.4 Experiment
  5.5 Summary
  References
Chapter 6 The Complete Picture: sb-Core andwb-Core
  6.1 Uncertain Opinion and Private Beliefs
  6.2 An Illustrating Example
  6.3 NTU-BU Games
  6.4 Properties
  6.5 Summary
  References
Chapter 7 Conclusion
  7.1 New Solution Concepts for Belief-based NTU Games
  7.2 The Future
  References
Book References
Index

新一代信息科学与技术丛书